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Then you have a look around, and see that none of the uninitiated are 
listening to us – I mean the people who think that nothing exists but 
what they can grasp with both hands; people who refuse to admit that 
actions and processes and the invisible world in general have any place 
in reality. 
         
  Plato, Theaetetus 155e1 
 
 
…as regards mere perception and receptivity to sensations he must 
count himself as belonging to the world of sense, but with regard to 
what there may be of pure activity in him (what reaches consciousness 
immediately and not through affection of the senses) he must count 
himself as belonging to the intellectual world…     
   
  Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 4:4512 
 
 
1. Introduction 
  A venerable tradition holds that the difference between human beings and the 
other animals is that human beings are rational animals, that is, animals with reason. In 
the philosophical tradition, reason is often identified as the active capacity or power of 
the mind.  This identification is implicit in the contrasts generally made between reason 
and sensation or perception, in the theoretical realm; and between reason and passion or 
desire, in the practical realm.  It is also explicit in the work of some of our major 
philosophers:  in Kant’s association of reason with the mind’s spontaneity, and in 
Aristotle’s doctrine of the active intellect or nous, for example.  Putting these two ideas 
together – that reason is what distinguishes us from the other animals, and that reason 
is some special way the active dimension of the mind – we get the thesis that the human The Activity of Reason                                                                                                                                      2 
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mind is active in some way that the minds of the other animals are not, and that this 
activity is the essence of rationality. 
  My project in this paper is to articulate and defend that idea. I will offer an 
account of why the human mind is different from the minds of the other animals, and 
suggest a way of characterizing the activity of reason. Although my aim is to present a 
view that I find compelling rather than to argue against alternative views, I do wish to 
contrast my view with two other views that have currency on the contemporary scene.  
First, there is the view that particular substantive reasons are the primary locus and 
source of normativity, a view I will call “substantive realism” about reasons.  According 
to this view, the work of reason is to recognize and respond to these reasons.  So reason 
as conceived by this view is a receptive rather than a purely active faculty.  Second, 
there is the resulting view that rationality is something different from reason.  I will 
begin by discussing some worries I have about these views, some possible problems 
which I think can be traced to their failure to do justice to the activity of reason.   
    
2. Views that Give Priority to Substantive Reasons 
  When we talk about reason, we seem to have three different things in mind.  One 
is the general faculty or capacity of reason, often, as I have just said, identified with the 
active dimension of the mind.  Reason has also traditionally been identified with either 
the employment of, or simply conformity to, certain principles, namely rational 
principles, which may be taken to include some of the following:  the rules of logical 
inference, the principles which Kant identified as principles of the understanding, canons 
for the assessment of evidence, mathematical principles, and the principles of practical The Activity of Reason                                                                                                                                      3 
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reason.  A person is called “rational” when her beliefs and actions conform to the 
dictates of those principles, or when she consciously guides her deliberations by them.3 
And then finally, there are “reasons,” the particular considerations that count in favor of 
belief or action. To avoid confusion, I will refer to these particular considerations as 
“substantive reasons.”  
  There are a variety of views that one might take about the relationships among 
these three things.  According to substantive realism about reasons, versions of which 
have been advocated by Tim Scanlon, Derek Parfit, and Joseph Raz, among others, the 
primary item here is the third thing I mentioned, the substantive reason, a consideration 
that counts in favor of some belief, action, or attitude, and that has normative force.4 
Reason, according to these philosophers, is the faculty that enables us to recognize and 
respond correctly to these substantive reasons. 
  There are familiar worries, which I share, about both the metaphysics and the 
epistemology of substantive realism about reasons.  There are worries about whether it 
is consistent with a naturalistic view of the world, and about how exactly we are 
supposed to know what reasons there are.  But rather than going over this well-trodden 
ground here, I want to begin by talking about a problem less commonly discussed. The 
problem is that this conception of reasons seems to make them atomistic, in a way that 
makes it hard to see how they can do their job. What I mean is that, on this conception 
of reasons, it is hard to see why there is any general reason to expect that there will be, 
in any given case, one course of action, or even one belief, that the reasons, all things 
considered, will favor. Why should we expect reason so conceived to give us 
determinate answers about what to believe and to do, even in ideal conditions, when we The Activity of Reason                                                                                                                                      4 
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know what all the relevant reasons are?  That is, why shouldn’t it just turn out to be the 
case that some considerations favor a certain belief or action, while others are against it, 
and there is no more to say?   
  At this point an interesting disanalogy may emerge between theoretical and 
practical reasons. In the case of theoretical reasons, many philosophers would want to 
argue that we expect the reasons to give us an answer to the question what to believe 
because belief aims at truth. Substantive reasons in favor of believing something are 
reasons for considering it to be true; and since the truth is one thing, the reasons must 
ultimately count in favor believing that one truth.  So the faculty of reason, on its 
theoretical side, is a faculty that enables us to recognize considerations that will guide 
us to the truth.5 
  In the case of practical reason, on the other hand, some philosophers would give 
a very different kind of answer to the worry that the reasons might not point to a 
conclusion: they will claim that practical reasons have a measurable dimension – 
weights or strengths – and that we arrive at a decision about what to do by determining 
where the balance of these weights or strengths, that is, the “balance of reasons,” lies.6 
  Before I go on, I should perhaps make it clear why I think these two 
explanations are different.  We do sometimes talk about the weight of the evidence, and 
that may mislead us into thinking that the two cases are analogous.  But they are not, 
for ordinarily we only talk about the weight of the evidence in cases where we have no 
conclusive reason for believing one thing rather than another, and the weight of the 
evidence only shows us how probable it is that something is true.  More importantly, no 
one thinks that anything is true in virtue of being supported by the weight of the The Activity of Reason                                                                                                                                      5 
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evidence, and therefore those who suppose that belief aims at truth would deny that a 
belief is everything that it should be in virtue of being supported by the weight of the 
evidence.  But practical conclusions are supposed to be everything that they should be in 
virtue of being supported by the balance or weight of the reasons involved.  For actions, 
being supported by the weight or strength of the reasons is all that is wanted – it is 
essentially the same property as being “right” or at least “all right” – while for beliefs, 
being supported by the weight of the reasons is a way of getting at something else, the 
truth.  So if we accept this combination of views, we are left with a real, and rather 
puzzling, disanalogy.  And because of that, it seems hard to construct a consistent story 
about why beliefs and actions are both the kinds of things that need to be supported by 
reasons.   
  In the case of practical reasons, the idea of weights does have intuitive appeal in 
some cases, namely those in which we are comparing plainly commensurable things. 
The reason for giving me the painkiller is weightier than the reason for giving it to you, 
perhaps, if my pain is the kind that results from invasive surgery and yours is the kind 
that results from stubbing your toe.7  But few philosophers have anything much to say 
about how we go about balancing reasons in other kinds of cases, or have attempted to 
explain why substantive reasons should have this supposed dimension, “weight,” or 
“strength” that makes them commensurable. So I do not see any in-principle reason, on 
this theory, why our recognition of reasons shouldn’t leave us with a set of 
incommensurable considerations for and against various actions. Of course, on any 
theory of practical reason, there are problems getting decisive answers about what we 
should do in all cases, so perhaps it would be unfair to press this objection too hard. Or The Activity of Reason                                                                                                                                      6 
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some might be willing to accept it – in practical cases, perhaps, sometimes it really is the 
case that all we can get is a bunch of considerations for and a bunch against.  But if 
reasons do not, at least in principle, tend to favor a single belief or action, they will be 
not be very good at doing their job, which is, after all, to enable us to determine what to 
believe and to do.   
  This way of putting my complaint brings me to another worry I have about this 
theory.  Human beings, for reasons I will explicate shortly, need reasons.  We cannot 
determine our beliefs or actions without them.  And according to this theory, when we 
look around us, we find them.  But this seems like a mere piece of serendipity.  The 
reasons are in no way generated by the problem that, as it happens, they solve; they just 
happen to be there when we need them.  We need to make decisions, and lo and behold, 
we find around us the reasons we need in order to make those decisions, equipped with 
weights or strengths that will enable us to balance them up and arrive at a decision.   I 
might put it this way:  if reasons did not exist, we would have to invent them.  To me, 
this suggests that, contrary to the theory under consideration, that is what we do. 
Finally, let me mention one last concern. Those who favor this theory think that 
reasons are indefinable:  they simply exist, and cannot be analyzed or defined in terms of 
anything else.   I also find this worrying, because it seems to me that reasons and causes 
have something in common, something that suggests that they are species of a genus.  
Causes are certainly not considerations in favor of their effects, but we sometimes call 
them “reasons,” and we use both reasons and causes to answer “why” questions.  They 
are both, to adopt Aristotle’s term, aitiai, becauses.  But if reasons and causes are species 
of a genus, it should be possible, at least in principle, to define them. What is this genus? The Activity of Reason                                                                                                                                      7 
Christine M. Korsgaard 
 
 
This is something that, admittedly, is so basic that it is a little hard to talk about.  The 
Greeks called it a logos, Kant called it a ground, we might also call it a story, in the widest 
sense, as when philosophers say to each other, “you have to have some story to tell 
about that.”  On my own view, as I will explain later, reasons and causes are species of 
this genus, whatever it is, for we might define a reason as a ground of belief or action 
that has been endorsed by the person who believes or acts. 
 
3. Disconnected Rational Requirements 
  But before I turn to that, I want to say a few words about another contemporary 
theory, which concerns the middle category of the three things we associate with 
reason, namely, “rationality.” Some contemporary philosophers would call a person 
“rational” when she responds correctly to substantive reasons, and some would say that 
that is what being “rational” amounts to.  But others have reserved the word “rational” 
for what they consider to be a somewhat different set of ideas. For instance, in the work 
of John Broome, “rationality” is associated with a particular set of requirements, which 
govern the relations among our mental attitudes, but which do not seem to be 
connected to substantive reasons in the way we might expect.8  So for instance, we seem 
to be rationally required to conform our beliefs to the principles of logic.  But, according 
to these philosophers, that does not mean that if you believe P and you believe that P 
implies Q, you then have a substantive reason to believe Q.  Why not? Because your 
belief that P or your belief that P implies Q may be false, in which case we should say 
that you have no substantive reason to believe Q.  Or to take a practical example, we 
seem to be rationally required to take the means to our ends.  But according to these The Activity of Reason                                                                                                                                      8 
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philosophers that does not mean that we have reasons to take the means to our ends, for 
if your end is a bad one, then you have no substantive reason to take the means to it.9  
  Of course, these philosophers grant that if P is true and implies Q, then there is a 
reason to believe Q, and so they grant that it will seem to a person who believes P and 
that P implies Q that he has a reason to believe Q. (I assume that they think this because 
they think we know in advance that the world is logically unified, a point I will come 
back to.) So one standard response to the sorts of argument that I have just mentioned 
is to distinguish “subjective” and “objective” reasons or “oughts”:  the agent who falsely 
believes that P and also believes that P implies Q has a subjective, though not an 
objective, reason to believe Q.  But some philosophers deny that there is such a thing as 
a subjective reason. For one thing, the notion of a subjective reason is slippery in a 
particular way:  it is not clear which facts about your beliefs I am supposed to hold fixed 
when I identify your subjective reasons. Just your beliefs about the facts, say, or your 
beliefs about reasons as well?  In order to avoid the resulting conundrums, some 
philosophers prefer to avoid talk of subjective reasons, and say simply that people are 
sometimes mistaken about what they have reason to do, which is whatever is implied by 
the substantive reasons that actually pertain to their case. They would deny that there 
is any sense in which people should act on the considerations they take to be reasons, 
just because they take them to be so.  
  If you start from the view that I canvassed before – that reasons are objective, 
mind-independent, normative facts – this may look like a perfectly sensible response.  
Then all we mean by a “subjective reason” is your best estimate of what the objective 
reasons are, where those exist independently of your own thought processes, and are The Activity of Reason                                                                                                                                      9 
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things about which you can be straightforwardly mistaken.  But that view has its own 
conundrum, going back to medieval debates about the erring conscience.  For isn’t there 
a sense, after all, in which if someone thinks he ought to do something, then he really 
ought to do it?  Are we just confused when we say that a person should act on his own 
best judgment, and do what his conscience says? On my own view, there is a reason why 
we say things like this.  As a Kantian, I believe that the normative force of reasons arises 
from autonomy:  from the laws an agent gives to himself.  That implies that if an agent 
tells himself to do something, there really is a sense in which he ought do it, even if he 
should have told himself to do something else. This view gives ontological priority to 
the kind of item usually identified as a “subjective reason.”  On this view, a subjective 
reason is not your best estimate about what the objective reasons, independently of your 
thought processes, are.  Rather, an objective reason is just a subjective reason that has 
arisen from those thought processes correctly carried through: one that upon full 
reflection you could will as a universal law, say.10 
  Some philosophers will think that there can be no difference here:  the fact that 
there is a correct answer, or an objective reason, means that all we can be doing when 
we reflect on what reasons we have is tracking that objective reason. To address this 
view, it would be necessary to explain why not every way of arriving at an answer 
counts as “tracking” it.  The first step is to say that the “tracking” metaphor describes a 
way we arrive at mind-independent truth, whereas I am claiming that truths about 
reasons are mind-dependent.  But we then need a characterization of mind-dependence 
and independence that makes sense of the claim that one can be wrong about a mind-
dependent truth.  Philosophers who think that what is meant by mind-dependence is The Activity of Reason                                                                                                                                      10 
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that “thinking makes it so” will not be able to see their way to this conclusion. What I 
mean by mind-dependence is rather that the body of facts in question would not exist 
were it not necessary for human beings to conceptualize the world in a certain way, 
where the aim of that mode of conceptualization is not simply one of describing the way 
things are.11 Admittedly, for a Kantian, this leaves little that is mind-independent; but 
truths about empirical matters, where the concepts are ones we have adopted to describe 
things we find in the environment, are mind-independent.  We use the empirical 
concepts in part simply because of what we find around us.  Or to put it more carefully, 
what makes it necessary for us to use them is not just the way our minds work, but also 
the way the world independently of us works.  (I mean what makes it necessary for us to 
use the concepts, not what it makes it correct to apply them in this or that way.  That 
always depends on the world.)  Those who believe that objective reasons are mind-
independent in this sense treat them just like things we find in the environment.12  
  Those are large claims and I won’t try to defend them further here. Let me 
return to the view under discussion.  If rational requirements do not actually give us 
reasons, then what are they? Broome has proposed that they are “wide-scope” 
requirements on our attitudes, that is, roughly speaking, requirements that tell us not to 
have certain combinations of attitudes, rather than requirements to do or to believe 
particular things.  A wide-scoper thinks that the requirement of modus ponens, for 
example, tells us that we ought not to combine a belief that P, a belief that P implies Q, 
and a belief that ~Q.  We ought not to hold those three attitudes together.  But, for 
reasons we have already canvassed, it does not tell us that if you believe that P and you 
also believe that P implies Q, then you ought to believe that Q. At most, it tells us that The Activity of Reason                                                                                                                                      11 
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you ought to change one of your attitudes. The “ought,” as Broome puts it, is not 
“detachable.” 
  But the claim that rational requirements are requirements on our attitudes 
seems to me to ignore the context in which we deploy rational requirements.  On my 
view, rational requirements do not govern combinations of our attitudes.  They govern 
thinking, the activity of thinking; and that means that they govern someone who is 
actively trying to determine what she has reason to believe or to do.13 And thinking has 
a certain temporal direction.  To be rational is not just to have a set of attitudes that 
happen to conform to a rational requirement.  It is to follow to a rational requirement, to 
take it as an instruction.  Imagine trying to follow a recipe written by a wide-scoping 
chef.  Normally one might say, “after you sauté the tomatoes and the mushrooms, you 
should add a little salt to the mixture.”  The wide-scoping chef would insist that this 
cannot be right, since you might have put in black olives rather than mushrooms by 
mistake, and in that case, it would be much better not to add any salt.  So the most that 
that the recipe can tell you is that either you should add a little salt or you should 
previously have added black olives by mistake.  And of course, since the “should” is not 
detachable, there is no way to take a step.  If you hope ever to get your dinner made, 
you want to avoid recipes written by the wide-scoping chef.   If the job of rational 
requirements is to govern the activities of thought and deliberation, and the point of 
those activities is to direct us to belief and action, then rational requirements cannot be 
wide scope, since wide scope requirements cannot do that job. 
  Of course, some contemporary philosophers have also denied that rational 
requirements do govern thinking, or at least that they govern it in the way I am The Activity of Reason                                                                                                                                      12 
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proposing here, that we can be consciously guided by them. These philosophers argue 
that, because we reason from the content of our beliefs and intentions rather than the 
fact that we have them, we do not normally consciously employ rational principles.  
Their point is that, when I reason, I do not normally say to myself, for instance, 
“because I believe P and I believe that P implies Q, I ought to conclude that Q.”  
Furthermore, for the reasons I canvassed a moment ago, they also suppose that if I did 
say this to myself, I would be saying something false.  This is because, after all, it is not 
really because I believe P that I ought to believe Q.  It is because P provides evidence for 
or some other ground for an inference to Q.  My believing P is neither here nor there. 
The fact that I might be wrong about P just brings this out vividly. 
  These views have the odd implication that if human beings became self-
conscious about what we are doing when we engage in reasoning – that is, when we 
conform our beliefs and actions to rational principles – we would suffer from a kind of 
inability to carry on the activity of reasoning, or at least to carry it on with any 
confidence that we have any reason to engage in it.  And this is more than an abstract 
possibility, because lately a number of philosophers who hold these views have 
concluded that rational requirements are not normative after all. For them, the 
standards of rationality would be normative only if there were some general reason for 
conforming to them, and some philosophers, such as Niko Kolodny, have concluded that 
there is no such general reason.14  To me, it seems especially surprising that 
philosophers should see a problem here, for philosophers are, by profession, self-
conscious about what we are doing when we are reasoning. While doing philosophy, we 
frequently say things like “because you are committed to this, you must also accept The Activity of Reason                                                                                                                                      13 
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that,” and we say them to ourselves as well as to each other. Are we just mistaken in 
thinking that this makes any sense?15 
  I have already complained that, on the view that gives priority to substantive 
reasons, there is no explanation of why reasons exist:  they seem, rather magically, to be 
on hand to meet our needs.  On the views that leave rational requirements detached 
from the rest of the normative realm, similarly, we can begin to be puzzled about why 
rational requirements exist. Why do they exist, and where do they come from, 
especially if we are deluded in thinking they are normative? Here again, we may come to 
a distinction between theory and practice.  As I said before, I suppose that those who 
favor these views think that logical requirements exist, or seem to exist, because they 
think the world is in fact logically ordered. So if your views are not logically ordered, 
you know that one of them must be false.  But no such explanation can be given for the 
requirements of practical reason, so lately some philosophers have been trying to come 
up with alternative explanations of why, for example, it seems to us as if the fact that we 
have adopted an end gives us some reason to take the means to it.16   
  I believe that rational requirements exist because they describe the activity of 
reason, so now I will turn to my own view.17 
 
4. The Origin of Reason 
  In the Kantian conception that I favor, the three aspects of reason – that is, the 
faculty of reason, rational principles, and substantive reasons – are closely related.  The 
faculty of reason is not identified merely as the ability to recognize and respond to 
reasons.  The faculty of reason is identified rather as the active dimension of the mind, The Activity of Reason                                                                                                                                      14 
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and rational principles are then identified as those that describe or constitute rational 
activity. They are constitutive principles of rational activity.18 When those principles 
are applied by the person who is trying to work out what to believe or to do, they pick 
out the substantive considerations that we then regard as reasons.   
  That description of course is schematic, and I will not be able, on this occasion, 
to give arguments for particular rational principles, or to show that those principles do 
enable us to pick out substantive reasons.19 What I do hope to do here is to convey why, 
in general, it makes sense to regard rational principles as constitutive of the activity of 
reason, and how the resulting view deals with some of the issues I have raised about the 
other views.  
Let me begin by explaining what I think it means that we are rational animals.  I 
believe that the source of reason is a particular form of self-consciousness that 
characterizes the human mind.  As human beings, we are conscious of the potential 
grounds of our beliefs and actions as potential grounds.  A contrast will show what I 
mean.  A non-human animal is guided through her environment by means of her 
perceptions and her desires and aversions: that is, by her instinctive responses and the 
other desires and aversions she may have acquired through learning and experience. 
Her perceptions constitute her representation of her environment, and her instincts, 
desires and aversions tell her what to do in response to what she finds there. In fact, I 
believe that for the other animals, perceptual representation and desire and aversion are 
not strictly separate.  Either through original instinct or as a result of learning, a non-
human animal represents the world to herself as a world that is, as we might put it, pre-
conceptualized and already normatively or practically interpreted.  The animal finds The Activity of Reason                                                                                                                                      15 
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herself in a world that consists of things that are directly perceived as food or prey, as 
danger or predator, as potential mate, as child: that is to say, as things to-be-eaten, to-
be-avoided, to-be-mated-with, to-be-cared-for, and so on.  To put it a bit dramatically – 
or anyway, philosophically – an animal’s world is teleologically organized:  the objects in 
it are marked out as being “for” certain things or as calling for certain responses. I 
believe this because I think it is hard to see how perception could have been of any use 
to the relatively unintelligent animals in which it first evolved if something like this 
were not the case.  Perception could not just provide a simple animal with information 
on the basis of which the animal had to figure out what to do, so it must be that it tells 
the animal what to do.20  So these normatively or practically loaded teleological 
perceptions serve as the grounds of the animal’s actions – where the ground of an action 
is a representation that causes the animal to do what she does.  
The exact ways in which these normatively loaded perceptions operate on an 
animal to produce his actions probably differ in ways that can be ranged along a scale, 
depending on what sort of representations the animal has, or what sort of consciousness 
he has of them. Primitive animals may respond more or less mechanically to these 
perceptions; more sophisticated animals may operate with something more like concepts 
or categories of “food” or “predator” or “threat” to which they respond intelligently; and 
yet more sophisticated animals may even be aware that they and their fellows find 
certain things desirable or fearful.  Exactly how any given kind of animal’s 
representations give rise to his actions is a matter for further investigation, both 
philosophical and empirical.   The Activity of Reason                                                                                                                                      16 
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But however it may be with the other animals, there is no question that we 
human beings are aware, not only that we perceive things in a certain way, but also that 
we are inclined to believe and to act in certain ways on the basis of these perceptions. 
We are aware not only of our perceptions but also of the way in which they tend to 
operate on us. That is what I mean by saying that we are aware of the potential grounds 
of our beliefs and actions as potential grounds. 
And I believe that this awareness is the source of reason.  For once we are aware 
that we are inclined to believe or to act in a certain way on the ground of a certain 
representation, we find ourselves faced with a decision, namely, whether we should do 
that – whether we should believe or act in the way that the representation calls for or 
not.  Once the space of reflective awareness – reflective distance, as I like to call it – 
opens up between the potential ground of a belief or action and the belief or action itself, 
we must step across that distance, and so must be able to endorse the operation of that 
ground, before we can act or believe. What would have been the cause of our belief or 
action, had we still been operating under the control of instinctive or learned responses, 
now becomes something experienced as a consideration in favor of a certain belief or 
action instead, one we can endorse or reject.  And when we can endorse the operation of 
a ground of belief or action on us as a ground, then we take that consideration for a 
reason.  
What this means is that the space of reflective distance presents us with both the 
possibility and the necessity of exerting a kind of control over our beliefs and actions 
that the other animals do not have.21  We are, or can be, active, self-directing, with 
respect to our beliefs and actions to a greater extent than the other animals are, for we The Activity of Reason                                                                                                                                      17 
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can accept or reject the grounds of belief and action that perception and desire offer to 
us.  We can actively participate in giving shape both to the conception of the world in 
light of which we act and to the motives on the basis of which we act – and ultimately, 
in both ways, in giving shape to ourselves.  And it is the same fact that we now both can 
have, and absolutely require, reasons to believe and act as we do.22  
So here is part of the answer to one of the questions I raised earlier:  why there 
are such things as reasons, substantive reasons.  There are reasons because self-
consciousness transforms the grounds of our beliefs and actions – the perceptions and 
impulses that would have caused them if we lacked this form of self-consciousness – into 
substantive reasons.  This account of why reasons exist does link them to the problem 
that they solve:  in order to believe and act, we need to endorse some of the potential 
grounds of our beliefs and actions, and when we do that, we get substantive reasons.  
And reasons and causes do have something in common, namely that the reasons for our 
beliefs and actions, at least the initial ones, are the very sorts of things that would have 
caused our beliefs and actions had self-consciousness not intervened.  They are grounds 
of belief and action that we have endorsed.  
 
5. Identifying the Activity of Reason 
  But how do we exercise the self-directing power that this form of self-
consciousness gives us?  How do we pick out which grounds to count as reasons?  As I 
said before, my view is we use rational principles to pick out the substantive reasons, 
and rational principles, in turn, are the constitutive principles of the activity of reason.  
So in order to proceed, we need to know what the activity of reason consists in.  Now The Activity of Reason                                                                                                                                      18 
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obviously, if all that we could say about the activity of reason is that it is “evaluating the 
grounds of our beliefs and actions,” or “justifying our beliefs and actions” then it will 
look as if the substantive reasons need to be in place before reason – the general 
capacity of reason – can do its job.  No doubt this is part of the attraction of substantive 
realism about reasons. The substantive realist supposes that all we can be doing when 
we evaluate the grounds of our beliefs and actions is asking whether they “really are” 
reasons, where that is a question about whether they have some objective characteristic 
– intrinsic normativity, counting in favor – that cannot be specified in any other way.  
So I take the interesting question here to be whether there is some other way of 
characterizing the activity of reason, some other way of saying what we are doing when 
we evaluate the grounds of our beliefs and actions.  
  Ask yourself:  why do we need to evaluate the grounds of our beliefs and 
actions? What makes that necessary for us, and not for the other animals?  Is it just 
because they are not smart enough to see that beliefs and actions should be supported 
by reasons? Or is it because they lack a receptive faculty of reason, the way we lack 
sonar, and therefore they just cannot see the reasons? I have already suggested that 
what makes it necessary for us to justify our beliefs and actions is the form of self-
consciousness involved, which enables us to call the grounds of our beliefs and actions 
into question.  But when we do that, we are, at the same time, calling two other things 
into question: on one side, the way of representing or conceptualizing the world that 
would be given by our instincts if we did not have that form of self-consciousness, and 
on the other side, our own nature as the source of that way of conceptualizing and 
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and actions, it is because we are faced with two other tasks, or we could just as well say 
two other opportunities:  we both can, and need to, construct a new way of 
conceptualizing the world, and we both can, and need to, construct or reconstruct our 
own nature, as the subject of that conception and as a source of responses to the world.  
Those two tasks constitute the activity of reason.  The other animals do not need to 
justify their beliefs and actions, because their way of conceptualizing and responding to 
the world is simply given to them by their teleological perception, by the instinctive 
ways in which they represent the world to themselves. 
  There’s another way of describing these tasks that I think is helpful here, 
because it helps us to see why these activities should be shaped and guided by rational 
principles.  When we become aware that we are representing the world to ourselves, 
when we turn our attention away from what we perceive and onto the fact that what we 
are doing is perceiving, then there is a way in which the world loses its unity.  What 
was once simply given to us as the environment is now given to us as a heap of 
perceptions, or rather experiences, and it is now up to us to put them back together into 
a picture of the world.  And in a similar way where once upon a time we always knew 
what to do in response to a situation, our own possible responses are now given to us as 
a heap of desires and fears and impulses, and it is up to us to put ourselves back 
together.23  The principles of rationality are constitutive of the activity of reason, I 
suggest, because they are principles of unification.   
  In the practical case, here is the idea:  I believe that in order to regard your 
movements as actions that you can attribute to yourself as their author, you have to see 
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working in you or on you.  The twitch comes from your muscle, the slip from the ice 
below, but the walking – that comes from you, from you as a whole. Elsewhere I have 
written about how the principles of practical reason – Kant’s categorical and 
hypothetical imperatives – serve to unify our wills so that we can regard ourselves as 
the sources of our actions.  I will not try to repeat those arguments here. 24 Instead I 
want to talk about how it might work in the case of theoretical reason.   
  To conceive yourself as a knower, in my view, is to conceive yourself as able to 
form a conception of the world that will enable you to find your way around in it and to 
act effectively in it.  I include “act effectively,” because I want to emphasize that I do not 
just mean a conception of the world that will enable us to predict and explain events.  I 
also mean a way of conceptualizing the world that will answer to our needs as agents.  
As I have argued elsewhere, to conceive ourselves as agents is to conceive ourselves as 
the autonomous and efficacious sources of certain events in the world:  that is, as the 
self-determining causes of certain effects in the world.25  However exactly we work the 
details out, if something along these lines is correct, the conception of the world as 
causally ordered in a general way is essential to our conception of ourselves as agents, a 
conception that I believe is forced upon us in the first person deliberative standpoint.  If 
that is true, then that the world is, at least in a general way, causally ordered, cannot 
just be an empirical discovery.  For these reasons, I think we are rationally required to 
conceive the world as causally ordered, at least in some general way.26  
  For the world to be the sort of place in which you can find your way around and 
act effectively, it must be a unified place.  What that means is that the relations between 
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about how two things or events or regions of space-time are related to each other, we 
cannot think of them as parts of a unified world.  If we cannot trace causal relations, in 
particular, we cannot act effectively.  So it is the business of a conception of the world to 
establish these various relations.  Further argument is required, of course, but I suppose 
that we may think of the relations in question as logical, spatiotemporal, and causal.   
  Now we may raise a question about why exactly we suppose that the world 
admits of a conceptualization that will unify it in these ways.  Or rather, since saying 
“the world” makes it sound as if we already know that what we are confronted with is 
one unified thing, I should say instead that we may raise a question about why exactly 
we suppose that what we find ourselves confronted with in experience admits of a 
conceptualization that will unify it in this way.   
  One familiar form of philosophical argument reminds us that the unity of the 
mind and the unity of its object are interdependent.  Unless we conform our beliefs to 
logical and rational principles, our minds themselves are a mere heap of unrelated ideas 
or theses.  And a mere heap of unrelated ideas or theses is not about anything, and 
therefore cannot count itself as thinking about anything or knowing anything.27 So our 
conception of ourselves as possible knowers of a world independent of our minds, a 
world that we can think about, depends on our idea of the world itself as something of 
which we might possibly form a unified conception.   
  This explains, to take one example, why we have to take theoretical reasons to 
be both universal and what I call “public,” or agent-neutral, in their normative force – 
why that is a rational requirement.28  If you are to think of your experience as a 
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think that, suitably situated, another perceiver with the same sort of perceptual 
equipment would be having that experience too.  Now you might ask, if I am 
constructing a conception of the world, couldn’t I just construct a world that was my 
world, which only existed for me and nobody else? But the answer is no, because if you 
are to think of your experience as perception of an object, and perception as a way of 
knowing that object, then you have to think that if you were to come back to the same 
place tomorrow, and nothing had changed in the meantime, you would have the same 
experience again.  And that is the same thought as the thought that if another perceiver 
were suitably situated, he would have the same experience: both scenarios, after all, just 
involve a change of position. If you cannot have that thought – that if you come back to 
the same place later, and nothing has changed, you will have the same experience again 
– then you cannot think of your experience as perception of an object, and of yourself as 
the knower of that object, and your mind shatters into a mere heap of unrelated 
experiences.   
  It follows that if you are to take “I saw it” as a reason to believe it, you must take 
it as a reason with universal and agent-neutral or “public” normative force.  So it is not 
that we know in advance, somehow, that the world conforms to the principles of 
theoretical reason, and we should therefore expect true beliefs to do so as well.  Rather, 
that the world conforms to the principles of theoretical reason is a presupposition of the 
world’s being the sort of place we can think about and know about at all.  And I think a 
similar argument could be given for the normativity of the principles of the other kinds 
of connectedness I just mentioned – causal relatedness in space and time, the kind of 
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presupposition of the world’s being the sort of place we can find our way around in and 
also act effectively in – that is, cause things to happen in – ourselves.  And since we are 
faced with the task of constructing a conception of the world that makes that possible, 
we must suppose that the world can be conceptualized in that way. 
   
6. An Anti-Realist Conception of Rational Activity 
  I have been suggesting, in a very general way, that we are committed to 
conceptualizing the world as conforming to rational standards, because a conception of 
the world that does not do that cannot do its job, which is to enable us to find our way 
around and act in it.  The theoretical activity of reason is to construct such a conception.  
This picture of what reason does is of course a Kantian one, and I want to emphasize 
one implication of that, and also to respond to a possible objection that it raises.  First 
the implication.  I do not take it to be the only or even the primary desideratum of a way 
of conceptualizing the world that it should be “true.”  Propositions are true when the 
concepts that appear in them are applied correctly; but I do not suppose that ways of 
conceptualizing the world are themselves simply true or false.  I think of them on the 
analogy of maps, since they are devices that enable us to find our way around.  And, as 
is the case with maps, they are answerable both to the world they represent, and to the 
conceptual capacities of their users.  And in some cases they are also answerable to their 
suitability for specific cognitive tasks.   A tourist exploring the city center on foot will 
prefer one of those maps on which the cartographer actually draws little pictures of the 
buildings with their names written across them.  But this style of representation and 
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her purposes it is better if whole towns are represented by tiny dots, so that the spatial 
and directional relations between them are what emerge as perspicuous.  The more 
detailed map does not give us more truth, or less.  It gives us different truths and is 
more suitable for a certain purpose.   
  Of course this anti-realist way of thinking about what we are doing when we 
conceptualize the world is controversial.  But, leaving that aside – and here is the 
objection – it may also make it seem as if I have not after all offered an alternative 
description of what we are doing when we evaluate the grounds of our beliefs.  For 
surely, you might say, when we evaluate the grounds of our beliefs, at least in an 
everyday way, what we are interested in is not whether we are conceptualizing the 
world in the best possible way for our cognitive purposes, but simply whether the belief 
is true.   
  In response, I want to make a comparison, and also to pick up the practical side 
of the question again. In other work I have argued that whenever you make a choice, 
you are also at the same kind constructing your identity.29 The argument goes roughly 
like this.  From a third-person point of view, outside of the deliberative standpoint, it 
may look as if what happens when someone makes a choice is that the strongest of his 
conflicting desires simply wins.  But that is not the way it is for you, from your first-
person point of view, when you deliberate.  When you deliberate, it is as if there were 
something over and above your desires, something that is you, and that chooses which 
of them to act on.  This means that you take the principle or law on the basis of which 
you choose to be expressive of yourself: your principle speaks for you.  On this basis I 
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practical identity.30  The relevant point here is that the picture I have in mind is not that 
there is a two-step process: step one, you first choose some way of identifying yourself, 
and step two, you proceed to act in accordance with its principles, like someone 
following a list of rules.  Rather, the idea is that determining what we have reasons and 
obligations to do  – that is, adopting maxims or practical principles – is at the same time 
engaging in the work of identity construction, the ongoing project of a human life.31  
And I am not claiming that when we make everyday choices, we are normally thinking 
about our identity, rather than about what it is right to do, although I suppose we do 
think explicitly about our identity in this context sometimes. I do argue, however – 
again I will not try to summarize the argument here – that the fact that we are engaged 
in identity construction helps to explain why the process of thinking about what we 
have reason to do is governed by rational standards, because of the ways in which those 
standards secure the unity of the self and of agency.32  In the same way, I am proposing 
now that determining what we have reason to believe is at the same time engaging in the 
ongoing work of constructing a conception of the world, and that this helps to explain 
why that process must be governed by rational standards.  
  To see this it helps to think about the nature of believing.  Almost all 
philosophers would agree that believing P is related to the following things: being 
prepared to affirm P; being prepared to treat P as a premise in your reasonings about 
other matters; being prepared accept the logical consequences of P; and being prepared 
to act as if P were true.  Let’s call these things the concomitants of belief.  Some 
philosophers suppose that a belief is a particular mental state, something that simply 
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someone is in that mental state or not. If, say, someone sincerely affirms something but 
does not act as if it were true, the evidence is unclear. Other philosophers suppose that 
the concomitants of belief are constitutive of belief: to say that you do those things is 
what it means to say you believe something.  If someone sincerely affirms something but 
does not act as if it were true, we seem to have a contradiction on our hands; perhaps we 
will be tempted to deny that he could have been sincere after all. I myself take the 
concomitants of belief to be constitutive principles of believing: normative standards 
that arise from the very nature of believing.33  
  In other words, what I am proposing is that, for a rational animal, believing 
itself is an active state, it is doing something, it is an activity:  it is representing the world 
to yourself in a certain way.34 I think that failure to see this is part of where the second 
of the two views that I described earlier – the view that rationality is something 
separate from reason – goes astray.  Those who hold these views tend to conceive of 
beliefs and intentions statically, as mental states or attitudes, and therefore regard 
rational standards merely as standards by which we evaluate combinations of 
attitudes.35 The point is somewhat difficult to articulate, but I take this tendency to 
exemplify a general source of philosophical problems, especially in the philosophy of 
mind.  People tend to reify mental activities into mental states.  It is symptomatic of this 
that philosophers with these views talk about “forming intentions” rather than 
“intending.”  Being “formed” makes the intention an entity, something that can take up 
space in the mind.  And the mind is then conceived as a kind of place that these states 
occupy. All mental phenomena then seem rather like qualia, in the sense that they are 
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generally, seem more mysterious than it is, for it is not all as mysterious as qualia.  
Much of we call the mental, I believe, is actually things that we do.  
  However that may be, on my view, belief is not simply a mental state or attitude:  
it is a commitment to going on in a certain way.  I think it is a commitment to 
constructing your conception of the world in a certain way, where that involves a 
commitment both to certain truths and to the possibility of forming a unified and 
useable conception of the world that includes those truths.  The fact that someone may 
affirm something sincerely but not act as if it were true, and other such divided 
responses to the concomitants of belief, simply shows that for a rational animal, 
believing is something that can be done well or badly – and if badly, the failures can be 
of various kinds.  One may be inconsistent, or wavering, or fail to follow through.  That 
is why our beliefs, like our actions, call for justification – because in a rational animal, 
believing can be done more or less well.  And notice that on this view of what rational 
believing is, it makes perfectly good sense for us to say, both to ourselves and each 
other, that because you believe both P and that P implies Q, you ought to believe Q.  It 
is exactly like saying that because you promised to do A and you cannot do A without 
doing B, you ought to do B. 36  It is a reminder of the normative commitments that are 
constitutive of taking a certain kind of action, in this case mental action – believing 
something, that is, representing the world to yourself in a certain way. 
 
7. Conclusion 
  Let me conclude by summarizing the view I am proposing.  What does it mean 
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world in which things are already marked out for her as her food, her mates, her 
offspring, her enemies.  It is a conception of the world in her own image, as we might 
say, that is given to her by her instincts, and it tells her what to believe and to do.  But 
in the human mind, the development of a certain form of self-consciousness – 
consciousness of the potential grounds of our beliefs and actions – breaks up this 
teleological conception of the world.   It shatters the world into a mass of perceptions or 
experiences, and the self into a mass of desires and fears and impulses, and in doing so, 
it creates both the opportunity and the necessity for reconstruction. We are faced with 
the task of unifying the mass of perception into a conception of the world that enables 
us to find our way around and act effectively, and of unifying the mass of desires, fears, 
and responses into a self that can stand behind its movements as their author and so 
claim them as its actions. It is by imposing rational principles upon on the self that we 
unify ourselves into agents, and it is by imposing rational order on our perceptions that 
we form a unified conception of the world.   
  This conception of reason differs from the views I described earlier in systematic 
ways, ways that spring from the fact that it conceives reason as an active rather than as 
a receptive faculty.  On this conception, rational requirements exist because they 
describe the activities of reason, and reasons exist because we need them in order to 
determine our beliefs and actions.  Reasons and causes do have something in common, 
for at least in the first instance, reasons are the descendants of causes, the sorts of things 
that would have caused our beliefs and actions had self-consciousness not intervened.  
Our rational beliefs and intentions are not mere mental attitudes, but active states of 
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other beliefs and intentions. The work of reason in theory and practice is parallel rather 
than disanalogous, except that theoretical reason aims at unifying the experienced 
world, and practical reason aims at unifying the self.  And the reason that we human 
beings, unlike all the other animals, must justify our beliefs and actions, is because we 
alone among the animals must actively carry out the work of constructing a conception 
of the world and a self who is both a knower of that world and an agent within it: 
because we alone among all the animals have to engage in the activity of reason.  
                                                 
1 Quoted from the translation by M. J. Levett, revised by Miles Burnyeat, in Plato:  
Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper.  Indianapolis:  Hackett Publishing Company, 1997. 
2 Quoted from the translation by Mary Gregor.   Cambridge:  Cambridge University 
Press, 1998. 
3 When her beliefs and actions conform to these principles, or, some philosophers would 
prefer to say, when her beliefs and intentions conform to these principles.  As I will note 
later, some contemporary philosophers think that rationality concerns only the relations 
among a person’s mental attitudes, and some of these philosophers also think that an 
intention is something separable from an action itself, perhaps a mental state that causes 
it.  Those philosophers would not allow that rationality concerns the relation between 
attitudes and actions themselves. I believe that intentions are embodied in actions and 
inseparable from them (see my “Acting for a Reason,” in The Constitution of Agency 
(Oxford, 2008) especially pp. 227-9, and Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity 
(Oxford, 2009) 6.3.2, pp. 124-5), so I would reject these ideas.  Essentially there are 
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that we sometimes form intentions well in advance of the time of action.  We have the 
intention, and yet we have not acted, and so they must be separate.  I think, however, 
that as soon as you “form an intention” – that is, make a decision – you begin to act, 
because you must immediately begin to deliberate about all of your actions in such a 
way that the future action will be possible, and that is part of what it is to carry out your 
intention.  The second is the idea that someone may be prevented from carrying out an 
intention.  Suppose, for instance, that I form an intention but then I am immediately 
seized with an attack of paralysis. (Making it “immediately” blocks the force of my first 
argument.)  Surely I had the intention, but did not act, so they must be two separate 
things?  But it does not follow from the fact that we can identify two aspects of a thing 
as separate in a defective case that they are separate in a non-defective case. When you 
are dead, your life becomes something we identify as separable from your body, but that 
does not show that when you were alive, you must have had a separable soul.  An 
intention is like that – it is the life of an action, its form, its soul, and as such, it makes it 
the action that it is.  I mean this in the Aristotelian sense.  In Aristotle’s account, we can 
distinguish the soul from the living body conceptually, but the soul is the cause of the 
body only in the sense of  “formal cause” not “efficient cause.”  In the same way, we can 
distinguish the intention from the bodily movements (not from the action), but that doesn’t 
mean that the intention is a separate thing that caused those bodily movements, any 
more than the soul is a separate thing that causes the living body.  Rather, the intention 
is the form of the bodily movements.  (I thank Drew Schroeder for drawing my 
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allows us to describe akrasia as the failure to carry out an intention.  I do not think that 
is the correct way to describe akrasia, but explaining why would raise issues too large to 
be raised in this already bloated footnote.  
4 For Scanlon, see, for instance, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard 
University Press, 1998), Chapter 1; “Metaphysics and Morals” (in Proceedings and 
Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, Volume 77, No. 2, November 2003); 
“Reasons:  A Puzzling Duality?” (in Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of 
Joseph Raz, ed. R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler, and Michael Smith. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); “Structural Irrationality” (in Common Minds:  
Themes from the Philosophy of Philip Pettit, ed. Geoffrey Brennan, Robert Goodin, Frank 
Jackson, and Michael Smith Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2007); and his 
forthcoming Locke Lectures, Being Realistic about Reasons.  For Raz, see Practical Reason 
and Norms (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1990); Engaging Reason (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999); “Reasons:  Explanatory and Normative” (in New Essays 
on the Explanation of Action, ed. C. Sandis. Palgrave/McMillan, 2009); “Reasons:  
Practical and Adaptive” (in Reasons for Action, ed. David Sobel and Stephen Wall.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). For Parfit’s views, see his forthcoming 
book, On What Matters; and “Rationality and Reasons,” (in Exploring Practical Philosophy: 
From Action to Values, ed. Dan Egonsson, Jonas Josefsson, Björn Petterson & Toni 
Rønnow-Rasmussen. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001, pp. 17-39). 
5 Notice that the claim here is not merely that we have a faculty that enables us to 
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reason;  every animal with perception has that.  The claim is rather that we come 
equipped with a faculty that enables us to recognize the right way to move from that 
perceptual representation to what, according to this view, is supposed to be a uniquely 
accurate conception of the world.  
6 The view might be more complicated:  it might involve certain reasons that exclude or 
silence certain other reasons, for instance.  But for my purposes here, it is all the same:  I 
do not see what justifies the assumption that the reasons themselves will come equipped 
with some property that makes it clear how they bear on one another and so that enables 
us to “balance” them and reach a conclusion. I thank Barbara Herman for the reminder.  
7 Actually, I think that justifying this judgment is more complicated than it looks.  See 
the discussion of aggregation in my “Interacting with Animals” (in The Oxford Handbook 
on Ethics and Animals, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp and R. G. Frey. Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 2010.) 
8 Broome introduced the idea in “Normative Requirements,” (in Normativity, ed. 
Jonathan Dancy. Blackwell, 2000), and his written a number of papers on it, including 
“Normative Practical Reasoning” (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplemental 
volume 75, pp. 175-93); “Practical Reasoning” (in Reason and Nature:  Essays in the Theory 
of Rationality, ed. José Bermùdez and Alan Millar, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 
85–111),  “Reasons” (in Reason and Value:  Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz, 
ed. by R. Jay Wallace, Michael Smith, Samuel Scheffler, and Philip Pettit.  Oxford:  
Oxford University Press, 2004) and “Does Rationality Consist in Responding to 
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9 Another worry that motivates this line of thought is the worry that we can “bootstrap” 
reasons into existence. By adopting an end we create a reason to take the means; at the 
limit, if every action is a means to itself, we can create a reason for doing something just 
by deciding to do it. Since I think there is a clear sense in which we do create reasons, 
this doesn’t worry me in general.  If you can create a reason by making a promise, why 
can’t you create one by making a decision?  But of course not everyone thinks you can 
create a reason by making a promise; some philosophers think making a promise only 
gives you a reason by activating other, standing, reasons, like the reason not to 
disappoint someone’s expectations. These issues are all connected. In any case, I do not 
think that we can “just decide” to do something any more than we can “just decide” to 
believe something: in both cases, we have to at least persuade ourselves that we are 
determined by a consideration that has the form of a law.  
10 See The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 
254-8.  
11 Later I will explain why human beings have to conceptualize the world in terms of 
reasons and causes.  See also my “Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth-Century 
Moral Philosophy,” in The Constitution of Agency. 
12 See The Sources of Normativity, 1.4.8, p. 44.  
13 Niko Kolodny comes close to saying this when he identifies rational requirements as 
applying to processes rather than states. See his “Why be Rational?” (Mind 114:455 
(2005), pp. 509-63) and “State or Process Requirements” (Mind 116:462 (2007), pp. 371-
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14 Niko Kolodny, in “Why be Rational?” Of course, if you think that rational 
requirements are wide scope, then rationality doesn’t require that we have any 
particular beliefs or attitudes:  the most that rationality could require of us is that we do 
a little housekeeping on our attitudes, making sure that the contradictions and other 
incompatibilities somehow get weeded out.  It’s rather like cleaning out the attic.  So it’s 
no wonder that those who conceive of being rational this way think we might have no 
reason to do it.  
15 As I will argue below, it is a particular feature of human life that we human beings 
have control of, and therefore take responsibility for, our beliefs and actions.  The way 
we do that is by reasoning – thinking in accord with rational principles.  And that is a 
feature of human life that we try to realize in a special way when we do philosophy. So I 
find it rather staggering that a philosopher should suggest that rationality is not 
normative.  To me, this conclusion seems like a reductio ad absurdum of the views that 
lead to it. 
16 See Jay Wallace, “Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason” (in 
Normativity and the Will. Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 2006) and Joseph Raz, “The Myth of 
Instrumental Rationality.” (Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1/1 (April, 2005), pp. 
1-28).  
17 It is worth noting that if there are narrow-scope requirements, there are also wide 
ones.  If having an end requires you to take the means, then you certainly shouldn’t both 
have an end and not take the means.  You can derive a wide-scope requirement from a 
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one.  So if we can explain the narrow -scope requirements in terms of the activity of 
reason, as I suggest below, then we can explain the wide-scope ones as well.  If only 
wide-scope requirements exist, I believe, their existence is inexplicable.  
18 For more on the notion of constitutive standards and principles see Self-Constitution, 
2.1, pp. 27-34. 
19 I give arguments for the instrumental principle in “The Normativity of Instrumental 
Reason,” (in The Constitution of Agency), and in Self-Constitution, 4.3, pp. 68-72. I give 
arguments for the categorical imperative in “Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and 
Kant”, (in The Constitution of Agency,) and in Self-Constitution, 4.4, pp. 72-80.  I give 
arguments concerning the ability of the categorical imperative to pick out substantive 
reasons (that is, to give us determinate moral obligations) in “Kant’s Formula of 
Universal Law,” in Creating the Kingdom of Ends (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), and in chapter 9 of Self-Constitution. 
20 If you are inclined to say, “no, it’s instinct that tells the animal what to do,” I will 
reply that I am describing what I think is the form that instinct takes: the animal comes 
equipped to respond in certain ways to certain perceptual cues, and then expands this 
set of responses through learning.  See Self-Constitution, 6.1, pp. 109-32. 
21 Obviously, this is an empirical claim, and I can’t prove it. Were we to find another 
animal with this kind of self-consciousness, it would be a rational animal.  
22 This account of the nature of reason is taken with some modifications from The 
Sources of Normativity, especially 3.2.1, pp. 92-4 and “Fellow Creatures:  Kantian Ethics 
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Peterson. Volume 25/26 (2005). Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press; and on the 
Tanner Lecture website at: 
http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/documents/volume25/korsgaard_2005.pdf  
pp. 85-87).  
23 See Self-Constitution, 6.2.1-6.2.5, pp.121, 6.4.1-6.4.2, pp.125-6 
24 See “The Normativity of Instrumental Reason,” and “Self-Constitution in the Ethics 
of Plato and Kant” (both in The Constitution of Agency), and Self-Constitution, especially 
4.4-4.5 and Chapters 6-9.  
25 See Self-Constitution, chapter 5. 
26 I do not think it commits us to the view that every event has a cause. 
27 The ancestor of these arguments is Aristotle’s argument, at Metaphysics 4.41006a15, 
that you can get someone to agree to the principle of non-contradiction if you can just 
get someone to say something and mean something by it.  
28 I discuss the publicity of practical reasons in The Sources of Normativity, 4.2.1-4.2.12, 
pp. 132-45, and in Self-Constitution, 9.4.5-9.7.6, pp.191-206. 
29 In The Sources of Normativity, chapter 3, and in Self-Constitution. See especially 1.4, pp. 
18-26 and 2.4, pp. 41-44. 
30 In The Sources of Normativity, 3.1.1, pp. 100-2. 
31 See Self-Constitution, 1.4.4.-1.4.6, pp. 20-2; 2.4.1-2.4.2, pp. 441-4. 
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33 These arguments parallel the ones I made about the nature of volition in “The 
Normativity of Instrumental Reason.” those arguments treat “willing the means” as 
what I am here calling a “concomitant” of “willing the end.”  
34 It does not follow from the idea that believing is an activity in the sense described in 
the text that one simply can “decide to believe,” but then as I mentioned earlier, I don’t 
think that one can simply “decide to act” in the sense that would be parallel to the 
worrisome sense of “deciding to believe,” either.  
35 Kolodny, with his emphasis on “process” requirements, is an exception to this last 
point.  
36 This comparison will work for those who think that normative commitments are 
constitutive of promising, but not for those who think that the obligation of promising 
arises from the need to avoid certain harms or disappointed expectations.  This is what I 
meant in note 9 when I said that these issues are all connected. 